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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 930279-CA
Priority No. 2

MATTHEW WRIGHT,
De fendant/Appe11ant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim.
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony,

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the officer's use of a single photograph for
identification purposes was unduly suggestive when the process
omitted another suspect who looked like the defendant and who was
positioned to have stolen the involved check?

"[T]he trial court/

when confronted with an issue of the admissibility of an eyewitness
identification, must preliminarily determine whether the
identification is sufficiently reliable that its admission and
consideration by the jury will not deny the defendant due process."
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779 (Utah 1991); State v. Mitchell,
824 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App. 1991) ("Since questions of
constitutional rights are questions of law, we give no deference to
the trial court's conclusion . . . " ) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-501, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba,
presiding.

On March 9, 1993, a jury convicted Mr. Matthew Wright of

the above charge.

(R 116).

The trial court then sentenced him to an indeterminate term
of zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison, together with a $750
fine and surcharge.

The court immediately stayed its sentence,

placing Mr. Wright on probation with accompanying conditions.
(R 119).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 15, 1992, a black male entered Smith's Food
King on 2100 South and 900 East where he asked a checker, Brett
Huff, to cash a check.

(R 228-29).

The payor of the $50 check was

Robert Schmidt, a person with whom Huff was familiar.

Schmidt and

Huff had previously worked together at another branch of Smith's.
(R 225-26, 230). Mr. Schmidt is Caucasian.
The parties do not dispute that the individual attempting
to cash the check was not Mr. Schmidt.

Rather, at issue is whether

Mr. Huff misidentified Matthew Wright or whether another black male
who resembled Mr. Wright had attempted to cash the check.
Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Wright had been roommates and have
since remained friends even after the trial.

(R 213).

At trial,

Mr. Schmidt indicated that he did not know whether Matthew Wright
had attempted to cash the check, and, in fact, had suspected another
person.

(R 213, 220). Schmidt acknowledged that other black males

had lived near or visited their residence, including at least one
individual who resembled Mr. Wright.

(R 215-20).

William Clark was one such individual.

Mr. Clark and

Mr. Wright had the same hair style; the same hair length; they
weighed the same; and they were approximately the same height, with
nothing more than an inch or two between them.

(R 218-19).

summarized by Mr. Schmidt, "They looked a lot alike.

As

But just

because I know them I could tell the difference myself."

(R 219).

Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Wright had been roommates for
approximately five or six months.

(R 207).
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By contrast, Mr. Huff

and Mr. Wright had only worked "side by side" for one fifteen to
twenty minute period "putting the Shasta on the shelf."
242).

(R 227,

Huff stressed that their shift together lasted eight hours

and that he also had seen Wright "coming and going as I [Huff] was
leaving work and he [Wright] was coming to work."

(R 227).

Brett Huff admitted that he had joked about (and with)
African-Americans, making generalizations and "lumping
African-Americans together into a 'they' kind of category who
differed significantly from Caucasians."

(R 253).

Huff was from a

community with very few black individuals, with limited exposure
other than a six-month stint in the military.

(R 236-37).

When the black male asked Huff to cash the check, Huff
believed that the person was Matthew Wright.

(R 239) . However,

Huff still felt the need to ask the individual for identification.
Huff claimed he did this because, "I didn't know if Matt would
remember me or not."

(R 239).

For the first time at trial Huff stated that the man
mumbled, "You remember me; we worked together at Kearns."

(R 235).

Besides contradicting his explanation about asking for
identification, the claimed hearsay remark was omitted entirely from
all of the reports by the investigating officers.

The parties

disputed whether the remark was actually made.
There was no confrontation during the incident.

Huff did

not refer to anyone by name; he simply indicated that he would have
to clear the check with the manager.

Huff departed for a telephone,

seeking clarification from Mr. Schmidt.
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Officer Olson, who interviewed Huff after the incident,
acknowledged that he had used only one picture of Mr. Wright for
identification purpos^R

Olsnii Il nil m i l nil 'iiy I limit p h I

rii t a y s o l

six to eight similar looking suspects were more often used.

Olson

noted that after the one photo confirmation process, he simply took
Huff at his
suspects.

estigate other potential
(R 270-72),
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Brett Huff, the Smith's employee in the case at bar,
mistakecheck.

had attempted to cash the
While Matthew Wright may have resembled the suspect,

Mr. Huff's identification of h :i m was flawed because anothf
nidi vidua I V i U lain (.."" J a i. Ik, i i

looked like Mr

Wright, Clark

also had been in position to have stolen and cashed the check.
However, the police officer's one picture identificati oi I process
precluded Mi

Hull In mi even considering another suspect, a fatal

omission given the similarities between Wright and Clark and because
of the likelihood that the sole pictur
"the image ol itie photograph rather than of the person actually
seen[.]"
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ARGUMENT
THE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS WAS UNNECESSARILY SUGGESTIVE
AND IMPROPER
The parties do not dispute that Officer Olson used only one
photograph for identification purposes.

"The danger of such an

identification procedure, of course, is the heightened chance of
misidentification wherein a witness "thereafter is apt to retain in
his memory the image of the photograph rather than of the person
actually seen, reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent line-up or
courtroom identification."

State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 651 (Utah

1989) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84
(1968)).

Brett Huff, the Smith's employee, mistakenly identified

Matthew Wright as the person who attempted to cash the check.
Huff may have believed that the black male looked like
Mr. Wright, but Huff was never given the opportunity to consider
pictures of other suspects.

For instance, William Clark not only

possessed similar physical and facial characteristics as Matthew
Wright, Clark had also gained access into the residence where
Schmidt's checkbook was located.

Wright and Clark had the same hair

style; they weighed about the same; and they were approximately the
same height, with nothing more than an inch or two between them.
(R 218-19).

Robert Schmidt, Wright's roommate, noted the

similarities: "They looked a lot alike.
them I could tell the difference myself."

But just because I know
(R 219).

As roommates

Schmidt and Wright interacted continually over a six month period.
By contrast, Huff's brief acquaintance with Wright consisted

- 6

I win l- i in') t "" -ll'*«i ifiii I ifte ><n-in twenty minutes during an enaht
hour shift.

best, Huff also passed Wright as one person left

work just as the other arrived.

L

well

Huff did not know Wright
anothe

IIIi.lack male possessing

similar characteristics.
However, Huff may have well believed that Wright was
perse

temptec

pass the check because Wright and Clark

looked alike; Huff was shown only one picture; and the police
declined to further investigate into whether there were iini'v i t h o r
suspec-

-hereby prevent:ii i lg Hi iff from comparing or contrasting

between Wright and Clark.

Cf. Simmons,

-

at 384

("the

photographic identification procedure [may
suggest:! v € as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification")

Over time and

trial, Huff

steadfastly stood by the photographic imager 11 >w
memory.

d :i nto 1: : :i s

But see State v. Lonq f 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986)

("In

fact, the accuracy of an identification is, at times, inversely
related to the confidence
The entire identification process was flawed because unlike
Bruce, where an officer's initial identification and confirmation
encompassed no other suspects, 779
identification failed to incorporate a remaining suspect who looked
similar to Wright and who had access to the residence where the
checkbook was located.

The identified! urn M I . improper.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his
conviction and remand for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

/

day of September, 1993.

RONALD S. FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
1993.
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day of September,

DELIVERED by
this

day of September, 1993.
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ADDENDUM A

76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) Alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method
of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to
be:
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government, or any agency thereof; or
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks,
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any
person or enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A
misdemeanor.
182

